

# Strategic Planning of Intelligence and Security Agency of the Indonesian National Police in Maintaining Public Security and Order: The Case of the 2020 Omnibus Law Demonstrations

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## ARTICLE INFO

### Article History

Received : 25.11.2025

Revised : 19.12.2025

Accepted : 23.12.2025

Article Type: Research Article

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## ABSTRACT

The October 2020 protests against the Job Creation Law, marked by mass mobilization and significant unrest, tested Indonesia's public security framework. This study analyzes the strategic planning and early detection mechanisms employed by the Intelligence and Security Agency of the Indonesian National Police (Baintelkam Polri) in mitigating threats to public security during the 2020 Job Creation Law protests. Using a qualitative case study approach, data were collected through in-depth interviews with ten key Baintelkam Polri informants and analysis of relevant documents. The findings reveal that strategic planning was conducted through a structured intelligence cycle involving multidimensional risk analysis, cross-functional coordination, and continuous adaptation. Early detection was executed via integrated field and digital monitoring, comprehensive vulnerability indicators, and a rapid field reporting system. Intelligence products centrally informed operational decisions, while rapid estimation mechanisms enabled adaptive responses to emerging threats. The research concludes that intelligence-led early detection and strategic planning are crucial for maintaining security stability during large-scale demonstrations while upholding legal and democratic norms. Theoretically, it reinforces early detection theory and Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS) in domestic security, offering empirical insights into central intelligence's role in managing mass actions in Indonesia.

Keywords: Demonstration, Detection, Harkamtibmas, Intelligence, Strategy.

## 1. Introduction

The large-scale demonstrations rejecting the enactment of the Job Creation Law (Omnibus Law) in October 2020 marked a critical moment in Indonesia's public security history, revealing the delicate balance between freedom of expression and national stability. Centered in Jakarta, the protests drew tens of thousands of participants from labor unions, student groups, and civil society organizations, many of whom voiced opposition to labor and environmental provisions of the new law. The peak of the unrest occurred on October 8, 2020, when clashes erupted near the National Monument and Jalan MH Thamrin, leading to significant property damage, including the destruction of public facilities and transportation infrastructure worth approximately IDR 65 billion (Prayoga, 2020). The Indonesian National Police (Polri) reported over 5,000 arrests nationwide, while Amnesty International Indonesia documented more than 6,600 detentions and 402 cases of alleged excessive force (Amnesty International, 2020). These events underscored how public demonstrations, originally intended as peaceful expressions of dissent, can rapidly escalate into threats to Harkamtibmas (public security and order), testing the preparedness of Indonesia's law-enforcement and intelligence systems during a period already strained by the COVID-19 pandemic.

As the nation's principal institution responsible for law enforcement and internal security, Polri bears the constitutional duty to maintain order while upholding citizens' rights to peaceful assembly. Under Law No. 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police, the core functions of Polri include law enforcement, protection, and the maintenance of security. Meanwhile, Law No. 9 of 1998 on the Freedom to Express Opinions in Public guarantees the right to demonstrate but requires compliance with notification procedures and public-order regulations. Within this operational framework, the Intelligence and Security Agency of the Indonesian National Police (Baintelkam Polri) plays a pivotal role as the "eyes and ears" of the institution. Baintelkam's primary functions include detection, investigation, protection, and mobilization collectively referred to as Dikpamgal which serve as the foundation of its preventive and pre-emptive strategies. These activities aim to produce strategic intelligence reports that inform decision-making by Polri's leadership, ensuring that operational responses to potential unrest are both proportionate and well-coordinated. Thus, Baintelkam's function is not to manage demonstrations directly but to provide the intelligence groundwork that enables preventive and persuasive policing at the operational level.

The essence of intelligence operations lies in early detection, the systematic identification of potential threats before they evolve into crises. In the context of the 2020 Omnibus Law demonstrations, early detection and early warning were central to anticipating escalation risks. Baintelkam's strategic planning involved monitoring inter-regional mobilization patterns, mapping potential hotspots, and gathering classified information regarding the intentions and movement of protest organizers. These activities fall under the broader pre-emptive framework, which emphasizes proactive anticipation rather than reactive control. According to the theory of early warning systems (Sweijns & Teer, 2022), effective intelligence requires continuous risk analysis, rapid communication, and adaptive response mechanisms. In practice, this meant that Baintelkam's intelligence analysis had to be translated into actionable insights by operational units such as the Community Guidance Division (Binmas) and regional police commands, who were tasked with direct field engagement. The challenge lay not merely in data collection but in the accuracy, timeliness, and interpretation of intelligence that informed strategic decisions.

Despite the implementation of early detection mechanisms and the issuance of intelligence reports, violent incidents still occurred, raising questions about how well Baintelkam's strategic plans were integrated into field-level execution. The gap between intelligence assessment and operational response highlights the complexity of managing social conflict within a democratic system. It also underscores the need for continuous analysis and evaluation within the intelligence cycle, processes that allow strategic plans to be adjusted dynamically as new information emerges. As stated in Law No. 17 of 2011 on State Intelligence, intelligence institutions are required not only to collect and analyze data but also to provide accurate recommendations for preventive action. In this regard, evaluating Baintelkam's role in the Omnibus Law case is crucial to understanding the strengths and limitations of Indonesia's early warning and preventive security systems.

This study, therefore, focuses on the strategic planning process of Baintelkam Polri in maintaining public order during the 2020 Omnibus Law demonstrations. It examines how early detection, intelligence communication, and analytical evaluation were conducted as part of the agency's preventive framework. Specifically, the research seeks to: (1) analyze Baintelkam's strategic plan in responding to the dynamics of the Omnibus Law protests, and (2) assess the mechanisms of early detection and intelligence evaluation used to mitigate potential threats to Harkamtibmas. Through these objectives, this study aims to contribute theoretically to the understanding of police intelligence as a proactive component of democratic conflict management and, practically, to provide policy recommendations for enhancing early warning systems, strengthening inter-agency coordination, and ensuring that preventive strategies remain consistent with human rights principles. Ultimately, this research underscores that effective intelligence in a democratic society must balance security imperatives with transparency, adaptability, and respect for civil liberties, transforming surveillance into foresight and control into strategic prevention.

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1. The basic concept of security intelligence

The concept of security intelligence within the Indonesian National Police (Polri), as outlined in the Head of Baintelkam Regulation No. 1 of 2023, refers to a set of systematic efforts focused on early detection and early warning to prevent and address potential threats to public security and order (Kamtibmas). Its scope includes investigation, protection, mobilization, and counter-intelligence aimed at supporting government functions in maintaining domestic security. In a broader sense, intelligence is understood as an organized process of gathering and analyzing knowledge about events that have occurred, are ongoing, or may occur in the future, to provide leaders with information for decision-making and risk management (Sudarma, 2023). This definition aligns with Law No. 17 of 2011 on State Intelligence, which defines national intelligence functions as encompassing domestic, foreign, defense, police, and law-enforcement intelligence.

The essence of intelligence work lies in its proactive and forward-looking nature, its capacity for early detection, analysis, and interpretation of potential threats to produce actionable knowledge that enables timely decisions. The value of intelligence, therefore, is not measured merely by the amount of data collected but by the accuracy, reliability, and usability of the information in preventing or mitigating risks (Sumarjiyo, 2018). To ensure effectiveness and legitimacy, the implementation of Polri's security intelligence adheres to key principles stipulated in Regulation No. 1 of 2023, including professionalism, confidentiality, integrity, objectivity, and accuracy. These principles guarantee that intelligence activities are carried out by competent personnel, grounded in ethical conduct, based on verified facts, and aimed at delivering valid and strategic information for decision-making to uphold public security and national governance.

### 2.2. Demonstrations and the legal basis for managing public protests

Freedom of expression in public, as guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is recognized under Law No. 9 of 1998 as a fundamental human right and a manifestation of democracy in Indonesia. The law emphasizes that every citizen has the right to express opinions verbally or in writing without physical or psychological intimidation, provided this right is exercised responsibly. It establishes guiding principles such as the balance between rights and obligations, deliberation and consensus, legal certainty and justice, proportionality, and social benefit (Wijaya et al., 2023). Citizens exercising this right must respect others' rights, adhere to legal norms, and maintain public order and national unity, while law-enforcement officers are obligated to protect human rights and uphold legality and the presumption of innocence (Ariany & Perdana, 2025). Law No. 9 of 1998 also stipulates procedures and restrictions for demonstrations, including prohibited locations such as the presidential palace, hospitals, military installations, and vital national objects, and requires written notification to the police at least three days before an event. Non-compliance with these provisions may result in the dispersal of the demonstration and legal sanctions (Nasution et al., 2024).

Operationally, the Indonesian National Police regulate public-order management through Police Regulation (Perkap) No. 16 of 2006 on Crowd Control (Dalmas), which aims to maintain order while protecting human rights. The regulation distinguishes between initial crowd-control units deployed in peaceful situations ("green conditions"), advanced units for disorderly crowds ("yellow conditions"), and riot-control operations (PHH) for violent unrest. Officers known as negotiators are tasked with mediating between protesters and authorities. In accordance with the Police Professional Code of Ethics (Perkap No. 7 of 2006), officers must respect human rights, act under lawful command, and avoid excessive force, arrogance, or individual pursuit of protesters. The overall ethical framework requires police actions during demonstrations to remain within legal boundaries, emphasizing persuasive and preventive approaches over repressive measures, thereby ensuring that law enforcement supports both public security and democratic freedoms.

### 2.3. Maintenance of public security and order (Harkamtibmas)

Harkamtibmas represents a dynamic condition within society that serves as a fundamental prerequisite for sustainable national development, as no social, economic, or political activities can run effectively without stability and public order (Syahrum, 2024). This condition extends beyond physical safety to include the rule of law, a sense of social peace, and active public participation in creating a conducive environment. It reflects the collective capacity of citizens and state institutions to prevent and address potential disturbances, whether

structural or spontaneous (Aswin & Jumadi, 2020). Therefore, maintaining Harkamtibmas requires not only law enforcement but also public legal awareness and social solidarity to build resilience against conflict and disorder.

According to Law No. 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police, Polri's primary functions include maintaining security and public order, enforcing the law, and providing protection and services to society (Hermarani & Kuswardani, 2022). These functions highlight Polri's strategic role in ensuring social stability through preventive and community-based approaches such as community policing (Polmas), which positions citizens as active partners in identifying and resolving security issues. Grassroots initiatives like neighborhood watch systems (siskamling) reinforce collective awareness and safety, while officers such as Bhabinkamtibmas act as facilitators and mediators between the police and the community. The effectiveness of Harkamtibmas can be measured through indicators such as police response time, security along transport routes, levels of community participation in safety programs, and the enforcement of traffic safety standards, all of which reflect the harmony between institutional efforts and public collaboration in maintaining national stability (Saputra, 2023).

#### **2.4. Early detection theory in security studies**

Early detection is defined as a series of efforts and activities aimed at identifying and uncovering events, conditions, or situations that may indicate the onset of potential threats or disturbances. The purpose is to enable security actors to prepare and deploy resources for anticipatory action to prevent such threats from occurring or to manage them effectively if they materialize (Rahmat et al., 2023). This process requires effective communication among intelligence officers, other security personnel, related intelligence communities, and the public to collect timely and accurate information on early warning signals (Prasetya et al., 2019). The fundamental principles of early detection in security studies include prediction, timely communication, proactivity, comprehensiveness, and continuity (Proctor, 2025). Prediction involves anticipating realistic threats long before they emerge, while timely communication ensures that information reaches decision-makers early enough for preventive measures. A proactive stance emphasizes active threat identification, a comprehensive approach covers both internal and external dimensions, and continuity requires ongoing monitoring and regular updates in dynamic security environments.

Challenges in implementing early detection systems lie primarily in data quality, methodological complexity, and ethical considerations. Inaccurate, incomplete, or delayed information can weaken threat analysis and risk prediction (Lee, 2025). Designing valid early-warning indicators is also difficult due to the dynamic and multidimensional nature of socio-political variables. Moreover, privacy and human rights concerns may arise when intelligence collection intrudes upon individual freedoms (Proctor, 2025). A paradox also exists within early-warning mechanisms while they are designed to prevent crises before they occur, their effectiveness often depends on policymakers' responsiveness to subtle or ambiguous signals (Lee, 2025). Despite these challenges, early detection remains a vital strategic instrument in security and international relations studies, enabling state and non-state actors to identify potential escalations proactively and design mitigation strategies before tensions develop into open conflict.

#### **2.5. Security response theory to social conflict (Conflict Early Warning Systems - CEWS)**

The theory of security response to social conflict, particularly through the Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS), focuses on providing timely alerts about emerging crises, especially those associated with political violence (Sweijs & Teer, 2022). These early warnings enable relevant actors to take preventive, mitigative, or preparatory measures before a situation escalates. CEWS is designed to strengthen decision-making capacity by facilitating the anticipation of risks and promoting Early Action (EA) based on informed analysis (Sweijs & Teer, 2022). The operational mechanism of CEWS relies on both the quality of early-warning products and the process by which they are produced, communicated, and deliberated upon by information producers and users. These products can take various forms digital (e.g., geospatial maps), physical (brief analytical memos), or verbal (direct alerts to policymakers) and together form a systematic cycle that bridges data analysis with security decision-making (Bell, 2024).

In general, the CEWS framework follows a four-stage operational cycle: (1) Early Warning (EW), where threats are detected once risk indicators exceed predetermined thresholds, prompting the generation of urgent

alerts about potential crises; (2) Early Warning Communication, emphasizing the importance of credible, timely information dissemination by trusted institutions to ensure the warning's legitimacy and impact; (3) Discussion and Debate, a strategic deliberation phase in which decision-makers evaluate the evidence, assess potential consequences, and determine feasible interventions amid political and resource constraints; and (4) Early Action (EA), the execution stage involving coordinated responses from security forces, humanitarian agencies, local authorities, and other stakeholders to mitigate risks and prevent escalation. The success of this final phase depends on rapid mobilization, precision in planning, and effective inter-agency cooperation across national and local levels demonstrating CEWS's critical role as both a predictive and preventive framework in contemporary security management.

### **3. Methodology**

This study employs a qualitative case study approach to explore and describe how Baintelkam Polri (the Intelligence and Security Agency of the Indonesian National Police) formulated and implemented its strategic intelligence planning in maintaining public order during the 2020 Omnibus Law demonstrations. The qualitative approach allows for an in-depth understanding of social, institutional, and operational dynamics within the intelligence process without manipulating existing conditions. It focuses on how meaning, procedures, and contextual actions were developed by intelligence officers in conducting early detection, preemptive, and preventive strategies to maintain Harkamtibmas (public security and order). This approach enables the researcher to present factual and systematic descriptions of Baintelkam's organizational behavior based on real data and documented practices, emphasizing the integration between intelligence analysis, communication, and strategic decision-making in a democratic security context.

#### **3.1. Research design and approach**

This study employs a qualitative case study approach with a descriptive-analytical orientation to examine the strategic planning process of Baintelkam Polri in maintaining public order during the 2020 Omnibus Law demonstrations. It focuses on how early detection, intelligence communication, and analytical evaluation were conducted as part of the agency's preventive framework. The qualitative design enables a contextual understanding of the social and institutional dynamics underlying intelligence operations, particularly in the stages of early detection, early warning, and preventive action. Data were obtained mainly from official documents, intelligence reports, and policy papers, while interviews served as supporting data to validate and clarify the interpretation of documents through discussions with key analysts and field officers. This approach allows for a comprehensive portrayal of how intelligence information was collected, analyzed, and communicated to support proactive decision-making in maintaining Harkamtibmas, and specifically seeks to: (1) analyze Baintelkam's strategic plan in responding to the dynamics of the Omnibus Law protests, and (2) assess the mechanisms of early detection and intelligence evaluation used to mitigate potential threats to Harkamtibmas.

#### **3.2. Theoretical framework**

This research is grounded in the Early Detection and Early Warning Theory, the Conflict Early Warning System (CEWS) framework, and the Strategic Planning Concept in intelligence studies. The early detection theory explains how intelligence units identify and anticipate potential threats through continuous monitoring and coordination. The CEWS model emphasizes a four-stage cycle (early warning, communication, deliberation, and early action) reflecting the flow of intelligence from analysis to preventive measures. Meanwhile, the strategic planning concept positions Baintelkam as a planner and provider of strategic information, ensuring that collected intelligence is analyzed and evaluated within a continuous cycle of planning, implementation, and adjustment. Together, these frameworks guide the analysis of how Baintelkam's strategic intelligence functions supported early prevention and stability during the Omnibus Law demonstrations.

### 3.3. Research assumptions

This study is based on the following assumptions:

- 1) Institutional strain exists within Baintelkam Polri due to the high public and political pressure during the 2020 Omnibus Law demonstrations, coupled with limited operational resources and structural constraints.
- 2) The intelligence division responds to such strain by developing proactive and preventive strategies through early detection, negotiation, and coordination across police units.
- 3) Institutional effectiveness in maintaining Harkamtibmas depends on both external factors (public demands, political situations, and media coverage) and internal factors (leadership style, communication systems, and organizational culture).
- 4) Understanding these responses provides insight into which intelligence practices effectively prevent public disorder and which institutional limitations hinder operational readiness.

### 3.4. Data Collection Techniques

Data in this research are collected through in-depth interviews, field observations, and documentary studies.

- 1) In-depth interviews are conducted with key informants within Baintelkam Polri, including intelligence analysts, field officers, and policymakers, to obtain detailed insights into pre-emptive and preventive measures taken during the Omnibus Law demonstrations.
- 2) Field observations are carried out at Baintelkam headquarters to observe communication patterns, coordination systems, and operational dynamics without interfering with institutional activities.
- 3) Documentary studies involve reviewing official police regulations (such as Perkap), intelligence reports, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and related archives to validate and triangulate findings from interviews and observations.

To ensure data validity, this study employs triangulation techniques across sources, methods, and time, confirming the consistency and credibility of information gathered from various perspectives within Baintelkam Polri.

## 4. Results and Discussion

The dynamics of the demonstrations opposing the Job Creation Law (Omnibus Law) in 2020 revealed new layers of complexity in the management of public security in Indonesia. This complexity aligns with the principles of Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS), which emphasize timely alerts to enable anticipatory measures amid crises characterized by political violence (Sweij & Teer, 2022). These protests were characterized not only by nationwide mass mobilization but also by the acceleration of information flows, fragmentation of movement actors, and an increased risk of conflict escalation shaped by social, political, and digital factors. Within this context, the role of security intelligence became increasingly strategic, not merely as a supporting instrument for security operations, but as a core element in planning, anticipation, and risk-based decision-making processes. Security approaches emphasizing early detection, predictive analysis, and cross-functional coordination emerged as essential prerequisites for maintaining public security and order (Harkamtibmas) while upholding legal norms and democratic principles.

The formulation of strategic plans began well before the execution of protest actions through early detection activities and initial intelligence gathering. This proactive stance reflects the foundational principle of early detection, which requires active identification of potential threats to enable anticipatory action (Rahmat et al., 2023). Information collected included field reports, territorial monitoring results, and the dynamics of public opinion within digital spaces. These data were subsequently analyzed to assess patterns of mass mobilization, identify key actors, and map potential vulnerabilities in strategic locations. This stage illustrates that Baintelkam did not operate reactively but proactively sought to understand early signs of social discontent that could evolve into large-scale collective action. Risk analysis was conducted in a multidimensional manner, simultaneously considering political, social, security, and legal factors. Political

analysis focused on government policy dynamics, elite political responses, and the potential exploitation of protest issues by interest groups. Social factors encompassed the consolidation of labor groups, students, and civil society coalitions, as well as public perceptions of the Omnibus Law. Security considerations centered on potential disturbances to public order, the vulnerability of protest locations, mass mobilization capacity, and the risk of infiltration by non-structural groups. Legal considerations served as a crucial reference to ensure that all security measures remained within the bounds of legality and democratic principles, as mandated by the legal framework governing demonstrations (Law No. 9 of 1998) and police conduct (Perkap No. 16 of 2006).

The results of this analysis were translated into various intelligence products, including Information Reports (LI), Special Information (Infsus), intelligence estimates, and policy recommendations for the leadership of the National Police. This process underscores the intelligence function as defined by Law No. 17 of 2011, which requires intelligence institutions to not only collect data but also produce actionable recommendations for preventive action. These products constituted the primary foundation for formulating operational security plans by planning and operational functions. This finding underscores that intelligence did not function as a supplementary component but rather as the cornerstone of operational policy shaping the overall direction of security management. Cross-functional coordination played a pivotal role in implementing strategic plans. Baintelkam actively synchronized efforts with operational units such as Stamaops, Sabhara, Traffic Police (Lantas), Brimob, and Public Relations (Humas), while involving regional units when necessary. This coordination aimed to harmonize threat perceptions, clearly allocate roles, and ensure that all units operated within a unified strategic framework. The role of unit heads (Kanit) was particularly significant as intermediaries between field officers, intelligence analysts, and decision-makers, preventing information gaps and interpretative discrepancies during implementation.

The study's findings reveal that the intelligence products generated directly informed operational policy in the field, effectively bridging the "Early Warning" and "Early Action" phases of the CEWS cycle (Sweijns & Teer, 2022). Information regarding increased risk levels or changes in mass movement patterns was promptly addressed through adjustments in personnel deployment, security routing, and reinforcement at specific locations. In this regard, intelligence functioned as a driver of tactical decisions that were dynamic and grounded in real-time situational awareness. Moreover, awareness of rapidly changing field conditions prompted Baintelkam to adopt flexible strategic adjustment mechanisms through rapid intelligence assessments. When escalation unfolded beyond initial predictions, rapid estimates were produced to provide updated situational overviews and revised recommendations regarding objectives and follow-up actions. This mechanism enabled leadership to make adaptive decisions without waiting for prolonged planning cycles, ensuring that security responses remained aligned with field realities, thereby addressing the methodological complexity inherent in dynamic early detection systems (Lee, 2025).

The study further indicates that Baintelkam Polri's early detection mechanism operated through a tiered operational architecture integrating fieldwork and strategic analysis. This architecture embodies the principle of comprehensiveness in early detection, which requires monitoring both internal and external dimensions of a threat environment (Proctor, 2025). Bhayangkara Operational Supervisory (BOP) personnel functioned as the frontline in observing real-time field dynamics, conducting monitoring and engagement activities, and ensuring that all information was contextually understood prior to reporting. Raw field data were subsequently filtered and managed at the unit level to ensure relevance and accuracy before advancing to the analytical stage. Early detection was implemented through a dual-track approach: territorial monitoring and digital surveillance. Territorial monitoring was conducted through official directives to regional Intelkam directorates to map protest agendas involving labor groups, students, and other societal elements. The results of this mapping were analyzed to assess vulnerability levels across regions. Digital monitoring focused on analyzing social media content, including calls to action, flyers, provocative narratives, and public discourse trends that could serve as early indicators of escalation. Indicators of public order vulnerability were comprehensive, encompassing mass quantity, protest targets, and the quality of actors and narratives involved. Increases in crowd size, inter-regional mobilization, and concentration of protests at vital objects or government centers constituted primary indicators. Additionally, shifts in communication tone toward provocation and the emergence of non-structural groups were continuously monitored as critical warning signals.

To support rapid response, Baintelkam implemented a tiered yet real-time reporting flow, which is a critical component of the "Early Warning Communication" stage in CEWS, ensuring credible and timely information reaches decision-makers (Bell, 2024). In Jakarta and its surrounding areas, situational reports were transmitted directly to the central command post and periodically updated to leadership through digital communication platforms. Reports from other regions were compiled and submitted periodically before being formalized into intelligence products. This system ensured the timely availability of strategic information to support decision-making processes. When early detection identified unexpected threats, rapid response mechanisms were immediately activated. Measures included the preparation of brief intelligence estimates, the convening of cross-functional coordination meetings, and directives to intelligence units to intensify monitoring and implement mitigation efforts. This approach reflects institutional adaptability in addressing spontaneous and unpredictable threats.

Despite the relative effectiveness of the early detection mechanism, the study also identified several operational challenges. These challenges resonate with established critiques of early warning systems, particularly concerning data quality, the difficulty of designing valid indicators, and the paradox of policymakers' responsiveness to ambiguous signals (Lee, 2025). These challenges included rapid escalation of situations, the emergence of spontaneous tactical groups, information overload with varying levels of validity, and reputational risks stemming from personnel actions outside established procedures. Such challenges demanded high analytical capacity, accurate prioritization, and robust inter-unit coordination. Post-demonstration evaluations yielded significant institutional lessons, including the need to enhance data-driven early detection capabilities, strengthen predictive analysis skills, and deepen integration between digital monitoring and field observation. Furthermore, governance of information flows and cross-functional coordination must be continually reinforced to ensure that security responses remain measured and controlled rather than reactive.

Overall, the findings demonstrate that Baintelkam Polri's strategic planning and early detection mechanisms in managing the 2020 Omnibus Law demonstrations were implemented through a systematic, adaptive, and intelligence-driven approach. This approach aligns with early detection theory and the operational cycle of Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS), which emphasize timely warning, effective communication, and preventive action as foundations for maintaining security stability (Sweij & Teer, 2022). Consequently, this study contributes empirically to the understanding of the role of central-level intelligence in managing mass actions in Indonesia and reinforces the argument that security stability within a democratic context is highly dependent on the quality of intelligence-based strategic planning and early detection mechanisms.

## 5. Conclusion

Based on the research findings, it can be concluded that Baintelkam Polri plays a strategic role as an early warning institution within Indonesia's public security and order maintenance system, particularly in handling the demonstrations opposing the Job Creation Law (Omnibus Law) in 2020. This role is carried out through structured intelligence-based strategic planning that is preventive and predictive in orientation, while consistently upholding the principle of respect for freedom of expression. The strategic plan is formulated through a comprehensive intelligence cycle, encompassing early issue detection, multidimensional risk analysis, mapping of action group networks, and the production of intelligence outputs that serve as the basis for leadership policy decisions. This strategy is adaptive and dynamic, allowing for continuous adjustments to rapidly changing field conditions, and is aligned with intelligence security theory and Conflict Early Warning Systems (CEWS), which emphasize threat prediction, timely communication, and continuous evaluation.

Furthermore, Baintelkam Polri's early detection mechanism demonstrates strong integration between field-based monitoring and digital surveillance. Information obtained from Bhayangkara Operational Supervisory (BOP) personnel is combined with analyses of public communication trends on social media to capture early signals of escalation, such as mass consolidation, shifts in narratives, and potential infiltration by non-structural groups. A tiered operational architecture ensures that raw information is processed into strategic, actionable intelligence, while real-time reporting systems and rapid response mechanisms enable

adaptive decision-making. Nevertheless, this research also identifies operational challenges, including the rapid pace of escalation, information overload with varying levels of validity, and reputational risks arising from personnel actions that deviate from standard operating procedures. These challenges serve as the basis for institutional strategic learning, particularly in strengthening data-driven early detection, enhancing predictive analytical capabilities, and reinforcing cross-functional coordination, thereby reaffirming the position of intelligence as a key actor in the prevention of socio-political conflict.

Future research should address several key directions. Comparative case studies across diverse protest contexts could identify transferable security strategies. Examining the operational realities of inter-agency coordination is necessary to identify effective collaboration and institutional barriers. Ongoing critical inquiry into the ethical and legal implications of digital surveillance is essential, especially regarding the balance between security imperatives and civil liberties. Research should also evaluate whether advanced analytical tools improve predictive capabilities and information management while upholding democratic accountability and oversight.

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