

Analysis of Operation Damai Cartenz Planning in the Management of Armed Criminal Group Mitigation in Papua

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ABSTRACT

Cartenz Peace Operation is a continuation of the Papua Task Force (2016) and Operation Nemangkawi (2018). The existence of Cartenz Peace Operation indicates a rapid shift in nomenclature. However, an in-depth analysis of its formation process reveals critical gaps in standard police operational procedures. There has been no in-depth study or planning conducted prior to each name or strategy change. In fact, a successful operation must be based on careful planning that begins with a comprehensive study. The study intends to examine the planning issues of the Cartenz Peace Operation and suggest reclassifying it as an Enhanced Routine Activity (KRYD) for better management of armed criminal groups in Papua. The research method used is qualitative-descriptive. The approach used in this study is a case study. Cartenz Peace Operation was chosen as a unique and specific case for in-depth analysis. The analysis will focus on the planning process, decision-making, policy implementation, and evaluation of the results of this operation. The results and discussion reveal that Cartenz Peace Operation did not meet the criteria for a police operation. Cartenz Peace Operation should be reclassified as an Enhanced Routine Activity (KRYD). This classification denotes activities conducted by regional units with increased personnel and budget allocations, without the rigid time limitations that characterize formal operations.

Keywords: Cartenz Peace Operation, Enhanced Routine Activity (KRYD), Planning, Papua

1. Introduction

The political situation in Papua has undergone significant changes since becoming part of Indonesia. The issue of Papuan independence remains a sensitive topic, frequently triggering violent incidents. Reported human rights violations occur across various regions of Papua, largely attributed to the Indonesian military under the pretext of safeguarding state sovereignty (Sarjito, 2024). The Free Papua Organization (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM), long recognized as a symbol of the separatist struggle, is now more commonly referred to by the Indonesian government as an Armed Criminal Group (*Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata*, KKB). This terminology shift, partly introduced through statements by Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Wiranto, represents an effort to reshape public perception of the movement.

Security conditions in Papua have become a critical issue demanding serious attention from the government of the Republic of Indonesia. Since Papua's integration into the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) through the Act of Free Choice (Perentuan Pendapat Rakyat, PEPERA) in 1969, the region's political, social, and security dynamics have been persistently marked by the presence of armed groups demanding independence. These groups, currently identified by the government as Armed Criminal Groups (KKB), frequently carry out violent acts ranging from attacks on military posts, arson of public facilities, to the

abduction and killing of civilians and security personnel. Even today, the situation in Papua remains under intense national scrutiny (Toroby et al., 2025).

The challenges arising from KKB activities in Papua constitute a national problem intertwined with democratic governance. These actions capture public attention and drain the nation's social, political, economic, and ideological resources in addressing an escalating and increasingly complex (Wijanarko, 2025). The Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) conducted research identifying four root causes of the fundamental problems in Papua: the marginalization of indigenous Papuans, developmental failures, human rights (HAM) violations and military violence, and the contested process of Papua's integration into Indonesia (Tempo, 2019).

The government has undertaken various countermeasures over time. Initially, the dominant approach was militaristic, involving large-scale deployments of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian National Police (Polri) for security operations. While aimed at asserting state sovereignty, this approach often yielded negative consequences. The resulting violence frequently led to civilian casualties and eroded public trust in security forces, inadvertently strengthening separatist sentiments and deepening the divide between the central government and the Papuan people (Aspinall & Chauvel, 2018).

Recognizing that a purely security-focused approach is insufficient, the government began adopting a more holistic strategy. Efforts have included policies such as Special Autonomy (*Otonomi Khusus*, Otsus). Yet, field implementation continues to face obstacles, leaving Papua's struggle for equality with other Indonesian regions far from resolved.

Legally, Otsus grants special authority to specific regions to administer and regulate their own governmental affairs according to their unique characteristics. Its goals are to enhance public welfare through more autonomous resource management, accommodate local identity and customary rights, all within the framework of the NKRI.

The implementation of Otsus in Papua, regulated by Law No. 21 of 2001, focuses on accelerating development in education, health, and the economy. Yet, its execution faces numerous challenges, including issues of fund accountability, policy overlaps, and the suboptimal participation of indigenous communities (Siahay et al., 2025). Thus, Otsus is not merely a financial allocation but a complex political and legal instrument. This research will delve deeper into how Otsus is implemented and the extent to which it has succeeded in fostering welfare, justice, and stability amidst evolving local and national dynamics.

A significant shift occurred with the launch of Operation Nemangkawi. Although its name carries strong law enforcement connotations, its implementation began integrating elements of development and welfare. This approach was still considered suboptimal as law enforcement (*gakkum*) remained the primary priority. Consequently, Operation Nemangkawi often faced criticism for failing to address deeper root problems, such as injustice, economic disparity, and the lack of dialogue between Jakarta and Papua (Widjojo et al., 2010).

The culmination of this evolution in Papua conflict management strategy was the launch of the Cartenz Peace Operation (Operasi Damai Cartenz) in early 2022. This operation marks a significant and fundamental paradigm shift from a repressive security approach to a humanistic and comprehensive one. Based on a decree by the Chief of the Indonesian National Police, the Cartenz Peace Operation no longer focuses on a militaristic approach but rather on a soft approach emphasizing community development (Binmas), intelligence, and public relations (Humas). Law enforcement becomes the last resort, applied only to KKB members involved in serious criminal acts (Nugroho, 2024).

This approach indicates the government's recognition that the issue in Papua is not merely one of criminality or armed rebellion but a multidimensional problem rooted in developmental inequality, cultural differences, and historical grievances. The main problem with the Cartenz Peace Operation is not the number of neutralized KKB personnel. A more crucial issue is whether this operation was planned and designed with a mature strategy, as the success of any operation heavily depends on meticulous study and planning conducted beforehand to establish measurable indicators of success.

Planning a security operation is an essential prerequisite in the domains of strategic studies and conflict management, requiring a coherent conceptual framework, clear boundaries, and measurable targets. In the

context of the Papua conflict, the Cartenz Peace Operation was launched with claims of a holistic approach. Still, critical analysis reveals a significant disparity between the "operation" nomenclature used and its continuous, open-ended implementation in the field. This misalignment raises profound academic questions regarding its effectiveness and accountability.

Fundamentally, security operation doctrine, as applied in military and police institutions, defines an operation as an action with a limited duration, specific objectives, and planned resource allocation. This aligns with project management principles emphasizing temporal boundaries to maintain accountability and measure success (Syahdi, 2025). Although termed an "operation," the Cartenz Peace Operation has in fact been periodically extended, blurring its time limits and eroding the temporary nature it should possess. This indefinite duration potentially reduces oversight effectiveness and can lead to inefficient allocation of budget and personnel.

The word "operation" in Cartenz Peace Operation could arguably be replaced with Enhanced Routine Activity (*Kegiatan Rutin yang Ditingkatkan* or KRYD). This aligns with the Appendix of the Regulation of the Chief of the Indonesian National Police Number 1 of 2019 concerning the System, Management, and Standards of Operational Success of the Indonesian National Police, which states that an KRYD is a police activity addressing community and/or governmental events that impact public security and order (Kamtibmas) and cause public unrest, which cannot be handled by a single function through routine activities.

2. Methodology

This research employs a qualitative method. Qualitative research emphasizes descriptive analysis, where the processes and meanings from the subjects' perspectives are central. Theory in this approach functions as a light to keep the research focused on field facts and to provide a general overview of the background.

In contrast to quantitative research, which tests theory with data, qualitative research begins with data, uses theory for explanation, and can ultimately generate new theory. As explained by Sugiyono (2019), qualitative research is grounded in post-positivist philosophy, conducted under natural conditions of the object, where the researcher acts as the primary instrument.

For sampling, this study applies snowball sampling or chain-referral sampling. This method starts with a small number of subjects, which then expands. The researcher initially selects one or two individuals; if the data they provide is deemed insufficient, other individuals considered more knowledgeable are sought. This process continues iteratively until the data is considered adequate and the sample grows.

The approach used in this study is a case study. The Cartenz Peace Operation was chosen as a unique and specific case for in-depth analysis. This approach enables the researcher to examine phenomena within their real-life context, specifically within the operational and managerial environment in Papua. The analysis focuses on the planning process, decision-making, policy implementation, and evaluation of the results of this operation.

3. Results and Discussion

A strategic shift in handling the Papua conflict is evident from the changes in the name and focus of operations. In 2016, the Papua Task Force (Satgas Papua) was formed, which later evolved into Operation Nemangkawi in 2018. Since 2022, this initiative has again been renamed the Cartenz Peace Operation, which continues to operate to date.



Figure 1. Current situation in the Cartenz-2023 Peace Operation Area

Source: National Police Headquarters

This historical timeline raises concerns, as it appears that no in-depth study was conducted prior to each name or strategic change. However, a successful operation must be based on mature planning that begins with a comprehensive study. Therefore, the planning of the Cartenz Peace Operation must be analyzed, as planning is the fundamental foundation that should have been established before the operation was launched.

Within the Indonesian National Police (Polri), the term police operations refers to routine activities. This term encompasses all planned and organized activities carried out by Polri to achieve specific objectives, whether for maintaining public security and order (harkamtibmas), law enforcement, or public service. Police operations are not limited to repressive actions like arrests but also include pre-emptive (preventative) and preventive (protective) measures.

Generally, police operations follow a structured cycle: the planning phase, the implementation phase, the control and supervision phase, and the evaluation phase. The planning phase involves problem analysis, objective setting, strategy formulation, and resource allocation. Mature planning is key to an operation's success. The implementation phase involves executing the prepared plan in the field by Polri personnel, where synergy and coordination among units are crucial. During execution, the operation is continuously monitored and supervised to ensure everything proceeds according to plan and to make adjustments if necessary. After the operation concludes, an evaluation is conducted to measure the level of success, identify weaknesses, and formulate recommendations for future operations. Routine police operational activities can include patrols (Turjawali) and activities carried out by community policing officers (Bhabinkamtibmas).

Nonetheless, when routine police operations are insufficient to address persistent problems, a formal operasi (special operation) is required, such as the Cartenz Peace Operation. Yet, based on the author's findings and analysis, the practical implementation of the Cartenz Peace Operation in tackling KKB issues in Papua more closely aligns with the concept of an Enhanced Routine Activity (*Kegiatan Rutin yang Ditingkatkan* or KRYD), rather than a military or police operation.

According to the Regulation of the Chief of the Indonesian National Police Number 4 of 2025 concerning the Sixth Amendment to Regulation No. 6 of 2017 on the Organizational Structure and Working Procedures of Units at the National Police Headquarters level, all Polri operational activities are carried out by various elements, including:

1. The Police Operations Main Staff (*Staf Utama Operasi* (Stamaops) Polri), which assists leadership in police operational management, integrated operational activities, and inter-ministerial/institutional cooperation at the headquarters level under the Chief of Police.
2. The Police General Planning and Budget Main Staff (*Staf Utama Perencanaan Umum dan Anggaran* (Stamarena) Polri), which assists leadership in general planning and budgeting at the headquarters level under the Chief of Police.
3. The Police Human Resources Staff (*Staf Sumber Daya Manusia* (SSDM) Polri), which supervises and assists leadership in human resource management at the headquarters level under the Chief of Police.
4. The Police Logistics Staff (*Staf Logistik* (Slog) Polri), which supervises and assists leadership in logistics management at the headquarters level under the Chief of Police.
5. The Police General Supervision Inspectorate (*Inspektorat Pengawasan Umum* (Itwasum) Polri), which supervises and assists leadership in oversight at the headquarters level under the Chief of Police.

The elements mentioned above are directly involved in any operation involving Polri, such as the Cartenz Peace Operation. According to the Appendix of Regulation of the Chief of the Indonesian National Police Number 1 of 2019 concerning the System, Management, and Standards of Operational Success of the Indonesian National Police, Item 2 on Police Activity Systems, a KRYD is a police activity that handles community and/or government events impacting public security and order (*Kamtibmas*) and causing public unrest that cannot be handled by a single function through routine activities.

KRYD includes:

- a) Internal Joint Main Function KRYD

Activities conducted based on routine analysis of Kamtibmas disturbances and special intelligence products;

- (1) Targeting crimes that have increased significantly and are causing public concern; and
- (2) Organizing Internal Joint Main Function KRYD, with the provisions that:
 - (a) It is prepared in the form of a Security Plan and an Assignment Order; and
 - (b) The Security Plan (Renpam) is prepared by the operations unit from headquarters to regional levels;
- (3) Operational control (Kodal) is conducted in a tiered manner;

- b) Internal or Stakeholder Joint Main Function KRYD

Activities conducted based on Kamtibmas situations causing widespread public concern, becoming a government priority, and receiving attention from police leadership.

- (1) Targeting community and government events, crimes with national-scale impact, issues disrupting national economic stability, incidents with SARA (ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group relations) implications, and Hoax-related news;
- (2) Organizing Joint Main Function and/or Stakeholder-involved (external) KRYD, with the provisions that:
 - (a) It is prepared in the form of a Task Force Plan (Rencana Satuan Tugas) and an Assignment Order (Surat Perintah Tugas); and
 - (b) The Task Force Plan (Rensatgas) is prepared by the appointed Task Force Commander;
- (3) Operational control (Kodal) is directed to the leadership (Kapolri/Kapolda/Kapolres).

KRYD refers to the intensification of existing security activities in a region, where additional personnel and resources are allocated without forming a new, separate operational command structure. If the Cartenz Peace Operation were conceptualized as a KRYD, this approach would be more efficient in optimizing resources. Additional personnel could be deployed through the *Bawah Kendali Operasi* (BKO) mechanism from units outside Papua that are geographically close or through special transfer and recruitment schemes for long-term placement. This strategy offers a sustainable solution that minimizes structural disruption and provides a more permanent security presence.

The management of police activities is always directed toward achieving Polri's objectives as outlined in its vision and mission within the Polri Grand Strategy, further detailed in the Polri Strategic Plan (Renstra Polri) and Annual Work Plan (RKT). By considering Intelligence Situation Estimates (*Perkiraan Keadaan Intelijen*) and the Chief of Police's directives (commander's wish), activities are carried out through Police

Activities by main police functions from headquarters down to the sector level, in the form of either Routine Activities or KRYD. Consequently, with the implementation of KRYD, there arguably should be no need for a separate Cartenz Peace Operation.

Based on the analysis, significant findings have been identified regarding the planning and management of the Cartenz Peace Operation. This operation, a continuation of the Papua Task Force (2016) and Nemangkawi Operation (2018), demonstrates a rapid shift in nomenclature. However, an in-depth analysis of its formation process reveals critical gaps in standard police operational procedures.

Further, this nomenclatural confusion also undermines the Operation Supervision (*Pengawasan Operasi*, Wasop) mechanism. Effective Wasop requires clear parameters to evaluate performance, including budget allocation and personnel deployment. Without strict time limits, the evaluation process becomes blurred and difficult to conduct objectively. The involvement of independent auditors, such as the General Supervision Inspectorate (Itwasum), is essential to ensure accountability. The presence of Itwasum in every phase of the Cartenz Peace Operation, from planning to execution, can ensure that resources are used appropriately, ultimately strengthening the operation's legitimacy in the public eye.

Thus, the author can delineate the critical gaps in the planning of the Cartenz Peace Operation for managing KKB in Papua as follows:

1. Absence of Pre-Operational Study

The primary finding of this research is the lack of a comprehensive study conducted before each name change or operation formation, including the Cartenz Peace Operation. According to police doctrine, an operation should emerge from an in-depth study of a phenomenon. For instance, the Police Bureau of Planning and Budget should study the potential threats from a new phenomenon, formulate a strategy, and only then launch a special operation.

In the case of the Cartenz Peace Operation, the change from Nemangkawi appears to be based more on political decisions than on systematic strategic study. The absence of a pre-operational study raises significant questions about the validity of the planning and targets set, as well as the appropriateness of the strategies used for on-the-ground conditions.

2. Absence of Planning in the Cartenz Peace Operation

The lack of mature and comprehensive strategic planning is a fundamental weakness of the Cartenz Peace Operation. Unlike police operational doctrine, which mandates an in-depth study before an operation is launched, the Cartenz Peace Operation appears to be more of a continuation of previous operations with a change in name, not based on a thorough evaluation.

The Cartenz Peace Operation is the result of the evolution of conflict management in Papua, starting with the Papua Task Force in 2016, then becoming Operation Nemangkawi in 2018, and finally the Cartenz Peace Operation in 2022. This pattern of change indicates strategic instability.

In operations management theory, any significant change should be preceded by a pre-operational study that identifies weaknesses of the old strategy, analyzes new challenges, and formulates a more effective approach. Unfortunately, field findings indicate that such a study was not conducted. The Cartenz Peace Operation was born not from systematic data analysis but from decisions that were more political or situational responses.

According to standard police operational procedures, an operation has three main requirements: a specific duration, clear targets, and a measurable budget. While the Cartenz Peace Operation has targets and a budget, its implementation is not time-bound and continues year-round. This violates the nomenclature of a police operation. Given the latent and persistent nature of the conflict in Papua, a more suitable approach would be an Enhanced Routine Activity (KRYD). KRYD allows for flexible increases in personnel and budget without being bound by strict time limits.

In theory, planning can be defined as the selection of facts and the making and use of assumptions about the future in describing and formulating proposed activities deemed necessary to achieve desired results

(Terry, 1972) Terry emphasizes that planning is the initial step of all management functions. It is an intellectual process involving goal setting and strategy development, all based on rational data and estimates.

According to Koontz and O'donnell (1976), planning is "the selection of missions and objectives and the actions to achieve them; it requires decision-making, i.e., choosing from among alternatives future courses of action." They view planning as a bridge between "where we are now" and "where we want to be." This function involves establishing objectives, developing premises, identifying alternatives, and selecting the best course of action.

Gulick and Urwick (1937) used the acronym POSDCORB to explain management functions, where "P" stands for planning. According to Luther Gulick, planning is "the outline of work to be done and the methods for doing it." Gulick saw planning as a fundamental managerial task that must precede all other activities to ensure organizational efficiency and effectiveness.



Figure 2. Project Management Cycle

Due to the lack of mature planning, the Cartenz Peace Operation struggles to measure its success indicators. The success of an operation is measured not only by how many KKB personnel are neutralized but, more importantly, by the extent to which it addresses root causes and creates sustainable peace. Without clear planning, this goal becomes difficult to achieve, and the operation tends to be merely a short-term response to incidents rather than a long-term strategic solution. This is evidenced by the operation's continuation year after year while the conflict in Papua persists.

3. Non-Compliance with Police Operation Nomenclature

According to Polri guidelines, a police operation has specific requirements: a specific timeframe, clear targets, and a measurable budget. Although the Cartenz Peace Operation has a structure, targets, and a budget, field reality shows that it runs year-round without clear time limits.

The hypothesis arising from this finding is that the Cartenz Peace Operation does not meet the criteria for a police operation. It should instead be classified as an Enhanced Routine Activity (KRYD). KRYD is an activity carried out by units in the region with increased personnel and budget, without the strict time constraints of an operation.

Classification as KRYD would be more appropriate for the persistent nature of the conflict in Papua, which cannot be resolved within a specific timeframe. It would also provide greater operational flexibility, allowing for strategic adjustments without the need for continual changes in nomenclature.

4. Personnel Issues and Solutions

Despite reported personnel shortages in the field, the solutions applied are often suboptimal. Instead of implementing strategic rotations or recruitment, the operation relies on less efficient approaches. This research proposes two solutions for personnel issues:

- a. Utilizing Operational Control Assistance (Bantuan Kendali Operasi, BKO): This could involve personnel from police units in regions near Papua, such as Sulawesi. This would increase personnel numbers without requiring large-scale transfers.
- b. Special Transfers or Recruitment: Large-scale transfers or targeted recruitment specifically for the Papua region could be conducted. This solution would build a more permanent force with an understanding of local conditions.

Overall, the findings show that the Cartenz Peace Operation has fundamental weaknesses in its planning and management. Moving forward, Polri needs to return to the basic principles of police operations, ensuring that every operation is based on thorough study and complies with established nomenclature.

As noted by Widjajanto (2010), security operation doctrine, in both military and police contexts, stipulates that an operation must have a limited duration, specific objectives, and planned resource allocation. This principle, aligned with project management, is crucial for maintaining accountability and measuring success. However, the Cartenz Peace Operation deviates from this principle. Although called an "operation," its implementation is continually extended periodically without clear time limits. This condition erodes the temporary nature of an operation, potentially reducing oversight effectiveness and leading to budgetary and personnel inefficiency.

4. Conclusion

The Cartenz Peace Operation is considered to lack clear indicators of success because it is not based on strategic and thorough planning preceded by in-depth studies. As evidenced by the findings, this operation tends to be a continuous activity with no clear time limit, which in fact violates standard police operating procedures. The KRYD approach, which focuses on increasing resources and personnel in the affected areas, would be more effective and in line with the characteristics of the conflict in Papua, which is latent and ongoing. Hence, instead of continuing to change the name of the operation, the National Police could focus more on optimizing KRYD to create long-term stability in the region.

Reclassifying the Cartenz Peace Operation as an Enhanced Routine Activity (KRYD) carries several important implications for policing in Papua. First, it highlights the need for institutional reform in the National Police's decision-making process, where operational strategies must be based on systematic studies, clear indicators of success, and evidence-based planning rather than ad-hoc changes in nomenclature. The KRYD framework would also encourage more stable and predictable allocation of personnel and budget, shifting the focus from short-term operational funding to long-term resource management that fits the protracted nature of the conflict. In addition, establishing KRYD status would provide greater legal and procedural clarity, strengthening accountability and conformity with standard police operating procedures. Strategically, this shift recognizes that the conflict in Papua is latent and ongoing, requiring continuous presence and community-oriented policing rather than episodic special operations. Ultimately, clearer classification under KRYD enables better monitoring and evaluation through measurable performance indicators, improving both effectiveness and public trust in law enforcement efforts in the region.

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